10 Issues to Watch in the 2026 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Dr Hassan Elbahtimy, King’s College London

From active wars in Eastern Europe and the Middle East to the expiry of bilateral strategic nuclear limits, the four-week NPT Review Conference is grinding against significant odds in this review cycle.

The Review Conference (RevCon) has also over the years become a massive, and sometimes overwhelming, platform. It is easy to get lost in speeches, committee meetings, and side events that address so many aspects of contemporary nuclear politics.

This makes it difficult to focus on what matters and why.

In this entry, I list 10 issues to watch in this review conference. This list is neither comprehensive nor ranked in order of importance. It reflects issues that I see as relevant in shaping the conference and also in understanding how, more broadly, nuclear politics are evolving.

If you want a deeper look at these issue, consult the latest edition of the NPT Briefing Book which I edit, and is published in collaboration between King’s College London and James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS). CNS produced an online portal that describes the content of each chapter and allows you to download it individually.

Here is my list of 10 issues that I’m particularly following this NPT Review Conference:

1. The Arms Control Vacuum and the N5 Deadlock

There are currently no immediate prospects for arms control between the US and Russia following the expiration of New START in February 2026. All five recognised nuclear-weapon states (the N5) are expanding, modernising, or diversifying their arsenals, with some even adjusting declaratory thresholds for nuclear use. The N5/P5 process, initially conceived in 2009 as a forum for meaningful confidence-building in support of disarmament, has become paralysed and unable to agree on even minimal measures. It might be unlikely that NPT nuclear-weapon states can agree on substantive measures to placate demands for disarmament at the conference. It will be interesting to follow how non-nuclear-weapon states respond to this narrowing prospect of disarmament. Many are pivoting to “strategic risk reduction” as a more pragmatic framework, evidenced by several joint statements supported by many states during this review cycle. Whether this can substitute for actual disarmament progress will likely be highly contested within the conference.

2. Fears About the Erosion of the Testing Taboo

While curbs on nuclear testing used to dominate early NPT Review Conferences, the norm is once again under pressure. Russia’s 2023 de-ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and US threats to resume testing sent shockwaves through the regime. Furthermore, the US and China have engaged in repeated, mutual allegations regarding low-yield testing activities. It is expected that nuclear testing will emerge as a highly contentious topic, with states debating these accusations. There might also be room for some potential proposals, such as a recent French initiative, to reaffirm and formalise the existing testing moratoria among the N5.

3. The Fallout of the War on Iran

The February 2026 Israeli and US attacks on Iran have catapulted the Iranian nuclear crisis to the forefront of global attention. This will undoubtedly impact the review conference, but the specific effect is worth watching closely, particularly given the current stalemate following the Islamabad talks. At the RevCon, it is fair to expect a fierce rhetorical clash. The US administration will likely project the conflict as a non-proliferation success, arguing that Iran is now further from a theoretical bomb. Conversely, many states will view these unilateral actions as unlawful, destabilising, and ultimately detracting from the very authority of the NPT. Navigating these competing narratives will be a monumental challenge, particularly for European, East Asian, and Gulf countries, all of which are caught in the crossfire of the conflict.

4. Threats to Nuclear Facilities in Ukraine

Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine continues to pose an alarming threat to civilian nuclear infrastructure. The situation is arguably more precarious today than during the last RevCon in 2022, as more evidence emerges regarding drone threats and targeted attacks on off-site energy supply lines. The 2022 RevCon failed to produce an outcome document largely due to last-minute Russian objections over references to Ukrainian nuclear facilities. The diplomatic tightrope this year might involve finding a way to firmly uphold nuclear safety and security principles without explicitly naming the Russian threat. Yet, it remains to be seen whether such a compromise can sufficiently address the gravity of the situation on the ground and garner widespread support.

5. The Middle East Zone

The UN General Assembly-mandated conference on establishing a Middle East Zone Free of Weapons of Mass Destruction has now held six sessions. It has established an ongoing programme of work, tackling various themes and instituting intersessional meetings. While, in practice, this new conference has taken some of the heat out of the NPT Middle East debates, the core issue is far from settled. Frustrations run high, and many regional states, supported by large groupings in the NPT, will argue that the 1995 Middle East Resolution and the 2010 Action Plan remain fundamentally unfulfilled. With Israel and the US continuing to boycott the parallel UNGA conference, regional states are likely to demand that the RevCon exert more pressure to secure the full participation of absent states amidst surging regional tensions.

6. AUKUS and Naval Nuclear Propulsion

The security partnership between the US, UK, and Australia (AUKUS) involves the development of conventionally armed but nuclear-powered submarines using highly enriched uranium. This creates a landmark precedent for safeguarding nuclear fuel used in naval propulsion. While the AUKUS partners insist they are committed to the highest non-proliferation standards within the context of Australia’s IAEA safeguards, China remains adamantly opposed, raising non-proliferation concerns and demanding broader discussions within the IAEA regarding this precedent. During the last review conference, Indonesia and Malaysia timidly raised some concerns. How prominently will naval nuclear propulsion feature in this review conference, and are positions on the matter shifting? It is worth noting that Brazil and South Korea have also become invested in the debate due to their own national programmes. Beyond the technicalities of verification, tracking this issue will reveal the degree to which China, traditionally a low-key player at RevCons, is now ready to throw its weight behind issues it prioritises on the conference agenda.

7. Emerging Technologies

The NPT is struggling to update its traditional agenda with pressing new topics, particularly regarding how to adapt to modern technological threats that cross over into the nuclear domain. Other UN fora have seen such issues fiercely debated as positions develop. For example, a recent UN resolution addressing the risks of Artificial Intelligence to nuclear command and control was adopted despite opposition from France, Russia, the UK, and the US. Similarly, a 2024 Security Council resolution aimed at preventing a nuclear arms race in outer space was vetoed by Russia. Discussions on emerging technologies and new domains might spill over into NPT discussions, making it fascinating to see how the RevCon attempts (or fails) to integrate these modern threats into its traditional framework.

8. Working Methods of the Conference

There is a growing recognition that the NPT review process requires institutional reform. The strengthened review process agreed upon in 1995 never truly materialised as planned. While procedures and working methods are not entirely to blame for the stark differences in national positions, there is an increasing understanding that the review process must be brought up to date. One of the positive elements of the last RevCon was the adoption of a decision establishing a working group to further strengthen the review process. This Working Group met in 2023 and discussed interesting ideas aimed at making the process more interactive, efficient, and transparent. However, they were unable to reach a consensus on the outputs. Nor was the chair of the 2025 PrepCom able to steer states parties toward passing a decision on the topic. Despite these setbacks, the issue is bound to surface again as appreciation grows that new methods are essential to making the review process more dynamic and relevant. Can this RevCon finally achieve a breakthrough on this front?

9. The Role and Leadership Style of the President

In any review conference, the president faces the daunting challenge of coordinating the disparate views of numerous states parties. The current president, Ambassador Do Hung Viet, is no exception. The rules of procedure provide the president with formal structures and committees to help reach an outcome, but historically, parallel informal tracks have frequently operated alongside these structures. How will the president run the conference, and what mechanisms will he rely on to draft a final document? In consultations, the president emphasised his desire to follow an inclusive approach, relying on formal structures with as much transparency as possible. He also indicated an intent to reform the work of the main committees to enable more interactive dialogue, and to submit a draft outcome document early in the proceedings, rather than in the final week, giving delegations more time to negotiate an outcome. Will states parties allow the president to follow through with his programme, or will he find himself stifled by the old ways of doing things?

10. The Endgame

How will the conference end? No outcome document has garnered consensus since 2010, and significant effort has been expended in the run-up to this conference to manage expectations for this Review Conference. If the conference fails to produce a consensus outcome document, as happened in 2015 and 2022, what happens next, and what does that say about the strengthened review process (which was a key ingredient in the indefinite extension of the treaty)? Recently, we have seen a growing trend where groups of states draft joint statements on key issues to codify norms outside the strict requirement of absolute consensus. Will this approach carry the day, or will other arrangements emerge to capture whatever minimal agreements states can reach? While many argue that the lack of a consensus outcome doesn’t necessarily impede the daily operation of the treaty, it undeniably diminishes the authority of the NPT as the cornerstone of international security.