The 2026 NPT Review Conference: Early Curveballs and Flashpoints

High friction, and the heat of the 'Right of Reply' in Week One.

We are now in the second week of the 2026 NPT Review Conference (RevCon). The opening formalities and the General Debate are officially behind us, and the substantive work of the three Main Committees is already underway.

In an earlier post, I laid out 10 structural issues I am watching during this remarkable NPT review conference. With the first week concluded, what are some of my early takeaways?

The first week is dedicated to opening procedures and mainly the General Debate. NPT procedural issues are not to be taken lightly. In the 2005 Review Conference, disagreements over the agenda delayed the start of substantial discussions for a long time.

The General Debate that follows is an opportunity for states to set out their stalls. In national statements, they raise issues of importance to them, and it is also where many current events and tensions are referenced and highlighted. It is also where group statements are delivered (and usually given more time). Because of all this, the start and the General Debate are excellent indicators of the conference’s atmospherics.

Here are the key issues that caught my attention from the opening days in New York.

1. The Absence of Top-Tier Political Leaders

NPT Review Conferences do not usually draw big political stars. Yet, the level of political attendance in this Review Conference is noticeably lower compared to previous cycles. The absence of top-tier political leaders was palpable. Of the five nuclear-weapon states (the N5), only France and the UK sent officials with a ministerial rank.¹ Even states like Japan, which sent its Prime Minister to the 2022 RevCon, opted for a lower level of representation this time around. With fewer ministers and no heads of state present, the conference opened with a diminished political profile, raising questions about how much political capital states are currently willing to tie to the conference.

2. Consensus Still Rules

The conference faced immediate friction during the opening procedural phase. The US delegation raised its objections to the election of Iran to one of the 34 Vice President positions. This position is largely ceremonial with little impact on the running of the conference, and candidates are nominated by their regional groupings. In this case, it was the Non-Aligned Movement group that made the nomination months before the start of the conference.

The US objected to the nomination on principle, citing what it sees as Iran’s problematic nuclear record. It was joined by Australia, the UAE, and the E3 (France, Germany, and the UK, with the three expressing ‘concern’ about the nomination). This could have led to a vote, where Iran would likely have been elected to the position. To avoid a formal vote and preserve the NPT’s tradition of consensus, a classic diplomatic workaround was deployed: the objecting countries took the floor to formally “dissociate” themselves from the decision, allowing the President to record their objections while proceeding with the election.

3. Show Me the Money

The conference faced another early challenge, again raised by the US, regarding its wallet. The United States called for a reform of what it called the NPT’s “fundamentally outdated” cost-sharing formula, pointing out a stark disparity: the US currently contributes 32.82% of the budget, while China pays only 0.91%.

The US suggested realigning contributions with the UN regular budget scale, which means China would have to pay more. The point made sense given how much China’s economic weight has changed, which has become increasingly reflected in its financial contributions to the UN more generally. China’s response was measured: it regretted that such a request was tabled without prior consultation and asked for time to consult with its capital. In a swipe at the US, it asked Washington to pay its arrears for the costs of this Review Conference and not withhold funds as a pressure tactic. Recognising the lack of consensus, the issue was deferred to private consultations so as not to delay the proceedings.

4. Reform vs. the Power of Precedent

Ambassador Do Hung Viet, President of the Review Conference, developed some encouraging proposals to revamp how the conference operates during the 8-month consultation phase. One of his key ideas was to simplify the structure of the conference by abandoning Subsidiary Bodies entirely in favour of thematic, interactive debates in the three Main Committees.

However, institutional inertia and regional priorities pushed back. The Arab Group was vocal in protecting a dedicated space to discuss a regional zone free of nuclear weapons. Ultimately, a decision was reached establishing three Subsidiary Bodies (one for each Main Committee) to hold private discussions on:

• SB 1: Nuclear disarmament and averting nuclear war (Article VI).

• SB 2: Regional issues, specifically the 1995 Middle East resolution.

• SB 3: Improving the effectiveness of the review process.

In a press briefing, President Viet struck a determined tone regarding the conference endgame. While many have argued that an agreed outcome document should not be the sole metric of success, he equated success directly with consensus. The President said in the briefing:

“I hesitate to say that it would be a success without an agreed outcome document. If the conference is conducted smoothly... it can be characterised as a good conference, but I wouldn’t say it would be a success.”

5. The Heat of the ‘Right of Reply’

Beyond the opening speeches, the “Right of Reply” segments exposed deepening rifts among states parties. These segments have effectively evolved into the primary mechanism for documenting the challenges facing an agreement. The excellent website of Reaching Critical Will noted 34 instances where the ‘Right of Reply’ was used in the General Debate. Compare that to just 5 instances in the 2022 Review Conference.

These can be grouped into five thematic flashpoints:

• The Middle East War and Enrichment Levels: The procedural drama over Iran’s Vice Presidency spilled over into clashes regarding enrichment rights, US-Israeli military attacks, and Iran’s military attacks on Arab states. The US defended its military action and accused Iran of noncompliance. Iran, supported by China and Russia, accused the US of unlawful military aggression, including bombing safeguarded facilities. The European E3 called for Iran to abide by its safeguards obligations. Meanwhile, the UAE and Bahrain denounced Iran’s attacks against them, while Iran accused them of complicity. That claim was denied by a response from some states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (excluding Oman).

• Strategic Stability and Arms Control: The deepening rift in global strategic stability was on full display as the US, China, and Russia engaged in a recurring cycle of replies regarding their nuclear policies. The US demanded “baseline transparency” to address China’s rapid arsenal expansion, interestingly quoting obligations under Article VI. China fired back, labelling US arms control proposals as mere “political posturing” designed to deflect from Washington’s own disarmament responsibilities, and asked the US to engage with the Russian proposal to hold to New START limits.

• The Ukraine War: The fallout from the war in Ukraine remained a bitter dividing line. The Ukrainian delegation forcefully condemned Russia’s “nuclear blackmail” and its blatant violation of the Budapest Memorandum, delivering a group statement supported by 43 states. The Russian Federation characterised these critiques as a “well-orchestrated political campaign” by the “collective West” to settle political scores. According to the Russian representative, 50 such anti-Russian statements existed. More concretely, Russia accused France and the UK of considering the transfer of ‘elements of nuclear weapons to Ukraine’. The claim was rejected by both Ukraine and the UK in their replies.

• NATO’s Nuclear Umbrella: China and Russia criticised nuclear sharing with non-nuclear-weapon states under NATO. This triggered reactions from the US, Germany, the UK, Poland, Italy, and Denmark, among others, affirming that such arrangements predated the NPT and are not contrary to the treaty. This topic has increasingly become a sticking point in NPT discussions.

• China Taking on Japan: China heavily targeted Japan’s nuclear policy and plutonium stockpile, describing it as “far exceeding civilian needs,” and used its second reply to label Japan a “nuclear threshold state.” This reflects historical trauma and bitterness in relations between the two countries, but also how nuclear issues increasingly feature as a point of tension in their relationship. Japan’s response was a rare class act in the proceedings of the debate, delivered with cool nerves and without much drama. It defended its record, insisting that its nuclear activities operate under the strictest IAEA safeguards and emphasised its adherence to three non-nuclear policies (no possession, no production and no stationing of nuclear weapons), while reminding the room that it is the only country to have suffered an atomic bombing.

The General Debate ended with space for non-governmental organisations to give their statements. My colleague Mark Goodman, former US State Department official now fellow NPT watcher, imaged writing a statement and shared it on Substack. It is under the title ‘The NPT Review Process is Broken’ and is worth checking out.

The General Debate wrapped up earlier than planned. The work of the committees started before the end of the first week, transitioning the conference to its next critical phase of proceedings. The big question remains whether differences between states, in clear view at the beginning of the conference, can be bridged over the coming weeks.

1. An earlier version of this article stated that neither UK and French ministers were represented by Foreign Ministers. In fact, France’s Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs Jean-Noël Barrot delivered Frances’ open statement. Since 2017, the French foreign minister is given the title ‘Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs’